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Fiscal Prerequisites for a Viable Managed Exchange Rate Regime
Abstract
The paper first reviews the budget identities of the fiscal and
monetary authorities and the solvency constraint or present value
budget-constraint of the consolidated public sector, for closed and open
economies.

It then discusses the new conventional wisdom concerning the

fiscal roots of inflation and the budgetary prerequisites for generating
and stopping hyperinflation.

The popular rational expectations

"Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic" model of Sargent and Wallace has
ambiguous inflation implications from an increase in the fundamental
deficit and is incapable of generating hyperinflation.

The only

runaway, explosive or unstable behavior it can exhibit is
"hyperdeflation"!

In the open economy, the need to maintain a managed

exchange rate regime does not impose any constraint on the growth rate
of domestic credit, arising through the government's need to remain
solvent.

Obstfeld's proposition to the contrary is due to the omission

of government bonds and borrowing,
There is not yet any "deep structural" theory justifying the
(exogenous) lower bounds on the stock of foreign exchange reserves
characteristic of the collapsing exchange rate literature.

Absent such

a theory of "international liquidity," one cannot model satisfactorily a
foreign exchange crisis that is not at the same time a government
solvency crisis.

Given such a lower bound, the existence or absence of

a pecuniary opportunity cost to holding reserves is shown to condition
the fiscal and financial actions consistent with prolonged survival of
the managed exchange rate regime.
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1.

Introduction
It ha• long been recognized that monetary, fiscal and financial

policy cannot be determined independently.

Like most insights in

economirs, this one is rediscovered, repackaged and re-emphasized
periodically • . Unfortunately, our subject is not one in which progress
in monotonic.
p~ak

Rather, half~truths gain acceptance and popularity, wax,

and wane in cyclical fashion, in order to be forgotten and

displaced by new·half-truths until the next turn of the wheel.

While

these cycles take place agajnst a steadily rising trend as regards
technical and mathematica~ sophist~cation and achievem~nt, there appears
to be, at any rate in the fields of macroeconomics and international
finance, no such positive trend at the conceptual level, or as regards
.new ideas and insights about the way the econ_omy works.
As a

graduate student an.d beginning assistant professor, I

witnessed, and in a minor way contributed to, one of these periodic
revivals of the notion that there is one less deg~ee of freedom in
monetary, fis~al and financial policy than an innocent bystander might
assume.

Ott and Ott ()965), Oates (1966), Christ (1967, 1968), Silber

(1970>, Blinder and Solow (1973), Tobin and Buiter (1976), Branson
(1976) and many others all added what was rather misleadingly called the
government budget constraint (or worse:

the government budget

restraint) to the familiar static closed or open IS-LM models.

In what

follows I shall refer to this "government uses and sources ~f funds
statement" by the descriptively more accurate name of government or
public .sectur budget identity.

The constraint on public sector fiscal

and financial choices will be reviewed below.
The plan of the paper is as follows~

Jhe remainder of this Section
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reviews the open economy public sector budget identity and ~haracteri~es
the public sector's intertemporal budget constraint or solvency
constraint.

Section 2 reviews the fiscal determinants of long-run

inflation in the closed economy and points out some problems associated

with the casual application of a popular model of Sargent and Wallace to
the analysis of hyperinflations.

Section 3 returns to the open economy

and establishes, contrary to what has been asserted by Obstfeld, that

the need to maintain a managed exchange rate regime does not impose an
upper limit on the growth rate of domestic credit, if there is no
exogenously given lower bound on the stock of foreign reserves.

If the

regime is viable (i.e. if the government is solvent) for any rate of•
domestic credit expansion (however low), then it is viable for all rates
of domes~ic credit expansion (however high)~

Section 4 reviews the

collapsing exchange rate literature for the case where there is ~n
. exogenously given lower bound on the level of reserves.
Consider the fDllowing set of accounts for the moneta~y authority
{or Central Bank) and fiscal authority (or Treasury) of an open economy.

Trre nation's foreign exchange reserves are assumed to be held by the
Central Bank.

Equation (1) is the monetary authority's budget identity;

equation (2) the fiscal authority's budget identity:

•*

_ -eR

(2)

p(G + K) + i(B + D) - T

•

- D + M

~

S - pfK _ B + D

His the nominal stock of base money (or high-powered money) which is
non-interest-bearing.

Bis the stock of government interest-bearing
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debt held outside the Central Bank.

For simplicity only one kind of

debt with a fixed nominal market value in domestic currency and a

variable nominal interest rate i is considered,

Dis the stock of

government debt held by the monetary authority, i.e. the stock of
domestic credit.

The change in D, Dis domestic credit expansion (dee>,

the monetary target so dear to the IMF,

R* is the stock of foreign

exchange reserves (denominated in foreign currency), iR* the interest

rate on reserves and e the spot foreign exchange rate.

Sis the

payments made by the Central Bank to the fiscal authority.

G is the

volume of government consumption spending, K the public capital stock, T
taxes net of transfers (excluding payments by the Central Bank to the
fiscal authority) and { the real cash rate of return on the public
sector c~pital stock,

(This need bear no relation whatsoever to the

social rate return on the public sector capital stock),

To keep life

· simple, pis the general price level, the price of government

consumption and the cost of a unit of public sector capital.
The (often implicit) assumption that the Central Bank pays to the
Treasury the entire amount it earns on its portfolio of domestic and
foreign assets (net of the costs of running the show, ignored here),

yields the familiar identity that

(3)

N _ D + eR'*

Contrary to what is generally asserted, {3) cannot be derived by
differentiating both sides of the standard Central Bank balance. sheet
reproduced below.
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Standard (incomplete) Central Bank Balance Sheet

Liabilities

Assets

H

Clearly, ditferentiating both assets and liabilities yields

.*

*.

H = D + eR +Re

The last term, capital gains (when positive) or losses (when
~egative) on the stock of foreign exchange reserves due to changes in

th~ exchange rate, has to be iot rid of.

This is accomplished by adding

the missing entry, Central Bank net worth, W, to the liability side of
the balance sheet.

With the further assumption_that capital gains and

losses (here only due to exchange rate changes, but in more ·realistic
models also associated_ with changes in the market value of long-dated

*' i.e.
domestic government debt) are absorbed into net worth (W =Re),
are not "monetized", equation

(3)

emerges triumphant.

Adding (1) and (2) together yields the consolidated public sector
budget

(4)

i den ti ty

(4)

* *

p(G + K) + iB - iReR

.

·,

- ptK - T _ H -eR

.

+ B

With a bit of rearranging, the public sector budget identity (4)
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can be written as the differential equation in B - pK - eR* given in
denotes the rate of inflation and E _ -e the rate of
e
exchange rate depreciation.

.equation (5).

rr

= tp

*
cit <B-pK-eR )

(5) d

Solving (5) forward in time and imposing the terminal condition given in
(6), finally gives us a government budget constraint.

Equation (7)

represents the government's intertemporal or present value budget
constraint or its solvency constraint.

(See Buiter (1983a, b) and

Buiter (1985a)).

V

(6)

lim (a<v> - p(v)K(v) - e·(v>R*~v) J exp
y.,;,c,)

t

co

(7)

[-J i (u) du]

co

J

T(s) exp [-{ i (u)du ]ds

t

+

J

M{s) exp [-{ i (u)du Jds

t

2: B(t) -p(t)K(t) - e(t)R * <t>
co

+

J

p(s)

6(s) exp [-{ i (u.>du ]ds

t
co

.I

[i (s) - (~(s)

rr(s)] p(s)K(s) exp [-{ i (u)du ]ds

+

t

co

+

I [i

.t

(!,)

-

( 1R(s)
.*

+

E(s))] e(s)R * (s) exp [-{ i (u) du ]ds.
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For simplicity I'll assume in most of what follows, that (6) and (7)
hold as strict equalities.
Equation (6) states that the present value of the government's net
non-monetary tangible liabilities should ultimately be non-negative. 1
If (6) is violated, the public sector never repays its debts; instead it

plays a Ponzi game by borrowing more in order to service its already

outstanding debt.

If (6) is satisfied, the growth rate of the nominal

value of the government's debt ultimately is less than the nominal
interest rate.

Equivalent statements are that the growth rate of the

real value of the public debt ultimately is less than the real interest
rater= i-rr, or that the growth rate of the public debt-domestic
product ratio ul~imately is less than r-n, where n is the trend growth
rate of real domestic output • . If (6) holds 1 then ultimately the
comprehensive primary (non-interest) government deficit (the second term
on the right-hand-side of (5)), must become a surplus.

While the

validity of (6) is not uncontroversial (why should it be required to

hold e.g. if the growth rate of real output systematically exceeds the
real interest rate?), I'll assume it to be satisfied in what follows.

Note that ev2n if (6) holds, net public debt and interest on the public
1

It

can

easily be shciwn using integration by parts that (6) could be

replaced by (6') lim ·[M<v>+B(v)-p(v)K(v)-e<v>R*<v)] exp(-J i(u)du)
v~
t

I
CX>

provided the term

M(s) exp [-[ i (u)du ]ds in (7) is replaced by

t

J
CX>

i(s)H(s) exp[-[ i(u)du]ds-M(H.

t

(See Buiter (1983 a, b)).

~

0
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debt can grow without bound, even relative to domestic output (if the
growth rate of net nominal debt, while ultimately less than i (to
satisfy (6)) exceeds n + rr).

This can occur because the growing

government interest bill represents growing interest income to the
private sector and therefore a growing tax base for the government.

If

lump sum (non-distortionary) taxes can be raised one-for-one with the
increase in debt service, we could, as pointed out by Mccallum !1984)
and Obstfeld (1986) have an exploding, but sustainable ~ublic debt-GDP
ratio.

Both the distortionary nature of real world taxes and the

existence of political and administrative constraints on the ability
indefinitely to raise taxes one-for-one with pre-tax income, suggest,
that the case of .the sustainable explosive net public debt-GDP ratio is
an example of economics strictty for economists only.

In what follows

it will often be safe to restrict the analysis to the case of a net
public debt-GDP ratio that is bounded from above.
Let us review briefly the. items in the government's solvency
cdnstraint (7).

It states that the present discounted value of future

explicit taxes net of transfers T plus the present discounted value of
future money issues or seigniorage M should be sufficient to cover the
outstanding net tangible non-monetary liabilities of the government
(B-pK-eR

1

)

plus the present discounted value of future government

consumption spending pG.

In addition, current and future tax and

seigniorige should cover any fuiure drain }gain) on (to) the Exchequer
due to the opportunity cost of government ~orrowing i exceeding (falling

short of) the cash flow rate.of return generated by public sector

8

capital, t+rr, and I or due to the opportunity cost of government
borrowing exceeding (falling short of) the pecuniary rate of return on

"*
international reserves, iR+E.

Note e.g. that if i =

~•rr,

the existing

stock of public sector capital is entered "at cost" in the public sector
balance sheet as an asset, and future public sector capital formation is

not a charge on the government's solvency:
it finances itself in the long run.

unlike public consumption,

Also note that in the case of an

ideal gold standard, i: = 0 and E = O.

By holding a "barren" asset with

a zer,o nominal rate of return the government, presumably in order. to

maintain its inter~ational liquidity, weakens its solvency if the
nominal interest rate on its debt.i is positive, as I shall assume
henceforth.

Borrowing to defend the exchange rate {increasing Band eR *

by equal amounts) will then require either

B

reduction in the present

discounted value of the government's consumption program, an increase in
the present value• of future taxes net of transfers or an increase in the
present value of future seigniorage in order to maintain solvency (see
Buiter {1986aJJ.

2,

The Fiscal Roots of Inflation in A Closed Economy
Somewhere in the early 1980's the "New Classical" macroeconomics,

led by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace, radiscovered the importance of
the government solvency constraint for monetary theory.

It is possible

to date this quite precisely, because Sargent's well-known textbook,

Macroeconomic Theory {Sargent (1979)) still contains a section titled
•In Defense of Keynesian Analyses That

0

lgnore" the Government's Budget

Constraint" (Sargent (1979, pp 107-111)), while the first of the papers
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analysing the fiscal origins of inflation (both hyper- and moderate)
appeared in 1981 and 1982 (see Sargent and Wallace (1981,1984), Sargent
(1982), and Sargent (1983)).

Ironically, the New.Classical rediscovery

of the government budget identity virtually coincided with the New
Cambridge rediscovery of the same identity by Godley and Cripps (1983).
The essence of Sargent and Wallace's argument (Sargent and Wallace
(1984))

1

is very simple.

Throwing out foreign exchange reserves for the

moment, the public debt-GDP ratio, b, and the public sector capital
stock - GDP ratio, k, are kept constant.

In the case of public debt,

this may reflect the fact that the debt burden has reached its upper
limit, because of economic or political limits on the government's
ability to t~x or for other reasons.

Nominai debt issues, B, are

therefore ju~t sufficient to offset the deciine in the debt-GDP ratio

that would. otherwise occur bscause of inflation or GDP growth <B =
(n+rr)B).

Similarly_, K = nK.

For simplicity we consider orily the case

where the share of exhaustive public spending in GDP, g, and the share

o~ taxes net of transfers in GDP,

T 1

are constant.

This permits us.to

obtain the following expression for the proportional rate of growth of

the nominal money stock,µ_ H
.H

(8)

JI _ v [g-T + (r-f) k + (r-n) (b-k)]

v denotes the income velocity of circulation of money, v _ P~_ where Y is
real output.
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The expression in square brackets on the right hand side of (8) is
a public sector deficit measure, but not the standard public sector
financial deficit (as a proportion of GDP> that is collected by the
national income and flow of funds statisticians.

First the conventional

deficit is "corrected" for the effects of inflation on the debt-GDP
ratio and for the effects of real growth on the debt-GDP and public

sector capital-GDP ratio.

The interest component is therefore not

i(b-k>, as it would be in the conventional accounts, but (r-n) (b-k).
Second, the primary (or non-interest> deficit in (8) only includes part
of public sector exhaustive spending.

Public sector capital formation

is excluded and only consumption spending is included.
subsidies, etc. are of course negative entries in

T),

(Transfers,
Finally,

allowance i~ made for any difference between the government's
opportunity cost of borrowing and the cash rate of return it obtains
· from the public sector capital stock (this cash return could of course
be negative).

Thus· the deficit that, given velocity, governs the

long-run or eventual rate of growth of the high-powered m~ey stock fs
the inflation-and-real-growth-corrected, return-on-public sector

capital-adjusted-government current account (or consumption account)
deficit.

(See Buiter (1984)) •.

Biven velocity, an increase in this "underlying" deficit will raise
monetary growth and thus, sooner or later, inflation, since rr is given
by

11

(9)

In the long run, velocity settles down.

Assuming that real growth

in the long run is independent of the rate of inflation, the long-run
rate of inflation varies on&-for-one with the rate of growth of money.

s,ecifically, Sargent and Wallace (1984) focus on policies that raise
the debt burden b.

Provided the interest rate exceeds the growth rate

of output and barring a reduction in the primary consumption deficit 6 _
g-T+(r-f)k an increase in the debt burden b will raise. inflation.
Reductions in monetary growth without changes in the primary deficit
will force the authorities to borrow more to satisfy the budget
identity.

The need to servi_ce the debt will eventually, after the debt

burden settles down at a higher leyel than it would have reached without
the earlier reduction in money growth, compel an eventual rate of
monetary growth rate which is higher than it would otherwise have been.
Th~s, with constant velocity, lower money growth (and thus lower
inflation) now without a reduction in the primary consumption deficit,
means higher money growth and higher inflation in the future.

If velocity is endogenous, an even less friendly outcome may occur.
A standard assumption is that· velocitj is an increasing function of the
nominal interest rate, e.g.

(10)
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Sargent and Wallace (1984) show that in a very simple, very
classical model with an exogenous real interest rate and exogenous
output the following may happen:-

The response to an early reduction in

money growth followed by a later increase in money growth (due to the
higher debt service incurred through the increased borrowing during the
period of lower money growth) may be higher inflation both earlier and
later.

The reason is that with endogenous velocity, a freely flexible

price level and ~ational, forward-looking expectations, the rate of
inflation today is a forwar~-looking exponentially weighted moving
average of all future rates of money growth, i.e. current inflation is
like a "present discounted value" of future money growth.

It is

possible that, in this present value calculation, the early lower rates
~f money growth are.dominated by the later hi~her rates of money growth,

le.ading to higher inflation throughout as a result of a decision to

.

lower money growth in the near term without implementing a "fundamental"
fiscal correction, i.e. a reduction in the primary consumption deficit.
With endogenous velocity, will a permanent increase in the
underlying deficit necessarily be associated with a higher rate of
inflation?

Here the model begins to creak a bit.

It is easily checked

that the non-linear model of equations (8)·, (9) and (10), with r, n,
k, b, g and
for"•

7

t,

exogenous can have zero, one or two stationary solutions

When there are two solutions, the low inflation equilibrium is

locally unst~ble while the high inflation equilibrium is locally stable.
Following t~e precedent of linear rational expectations models with a
single ·non-predetermined state variable (velocity or the price level),
Sargent and Wallace (1984) focussed on the locally unstable, low
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inflation equilibriu m.

For this equilibriu m, a permanent increase in

the underlyin g deficit does indeed raise inflation .

If the locally

stable high inflation equilibriu m had been chosen instead, a permanen tly
_higher fundament al deficit would, in the long run, have been associate d
with a lower rate of inflation .

The analysis of the transitio nal

dynamics in this case woul·d have suffered from the non-uniqu eness
problem that is always present when a non-prede termined variable is
required to converge to a (locally) stable equilibriu m:

there is a

continuum of initial values·of v or p that are consisten t with
convergen ce to the steady-st ate.
The model begins to creak even more loudly when it is used to
analyse hyperinfl ation~.

Th~ spirit of this model did indeed motivate

Sargent's well-know n study on this subject (Sargent (1982) and (1986)).
There is unfortuna tely no way· in this model to generate the kind of

.

explosive , unstable behavior characte ristic of hyperinfl ations.

When

there are two stationar y solutions , the only explosive behavior is with
reference to (and away from) the locally unstable low inflat~on
equilibriu m.

However, ·this unstable behavior represent s an implosion

rather than an explosion .

The model generates a steadily growing rate

of deflation ,
Successiv ely larger values of the underlyin g deficit will move the
economy from the range character ized by two stationar y equilibri a,
through the range with one stationar y equilibriu m into the range with no
stationar y 2~uilibriu m.

Here there is again plenty of unstable behavior

but it ·too takes th~ form of "hyperde flations" rather than of
hyperinfl ations.

One attempt to save the model for the analysis of

14

hyperinflations is to restrict the analysis to the range of underlying
deficits for which there are two stationary equilibria and to call a

hyperinflation the transiti--on fr.om the low inflation stationary
equilibrium to the high inflation stationary equilibrium.
however, is silly.

This,

Both stationary equilibria are just that:

.

well-behaved long-run equilibria with constant, finite rates of
in~lation.

There is nothing

0

runaway" or explosive about the transition

from the low t~ the high inflation steady state.

In fact the move from

the low inflation equilibrium to t~e high inflation equilibrium involves
initially an acceJerating_ rate of inflation (~ rises) but ultimately a
decelerating rate of inflation (~ fal,s) with~ smoothly approaching
zero as the economy eases _into the high inflation steady state.
.th e t r an sit i on f r om _rrL t o rrH i n F i g ur: e 1 ) •

..

"

+
0

1T

Figure l

(See

1S

To describe the traverse from "L to "Has a hyperinflation is akin to
describing a mild summer breeze as a hurricane.

(See also Buiter

(1985b).

Where does this leave us?

An equation like (8) provides a useful

benchmark for evaluating the long-term money growth consequences of a
given fiscal-financia l pac~age.
fiscal-financia l benchmarks (g,

Apart from specifying the
T,

k and b), we must be able to

determine velocity, v, the real interest rater and the cash rate of
return on public sector capital

e,

in order to calculate~~

The obvious

conclusion in a constant-veloc ity framework, that a higher underlying
deficit implies a higher eventual rate of growth of money, becomes

ambiguous even in th~ ~imple rational-expec tations, flexible price
level, exogenous output version of t~e endogenous velocity model.

Unlike the adaptive expectations (Cagan (19S6)) version of this model,
the Sargent a~d Wallace (1984) rational expectations version cannot

generate hype~inflations .

Next we extend these insights to the case of

an open economy with a managed exchange rate.

3.

What Constrains Domestic Credit Expansion Under a Managed Exchange
Rate?

A managed exchange rate regime is any rule for setting the nominal
spot exchange rate.

In what follows I restrict the analysis to

open-loop rules, and withing this class of rules to those involving a
constant proportional rate of depreciation or appreciation of the
nominal spot exchange rate.

Most of the results will apply unchanged to
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more general closed-loop or feedback rules for determining the exc~ange
rate.

I assume there to be a unified spot ~xchange market and no

capital controls or other foreign exchange restrictions.

Unless

otherwise indicated, there is perfect capital mobility and perfect
substitutability between foreign bonds and domestic bonds,
interest parity (UIP) therefore holds.

Uncovered

If i* denotes the nominal

interest rate on riskless foreign bonds, then

(11)

i = i* + E

2

I ignore direct currency substitution.

The formal analysis goes

through even with ditett currency.substitution, as long as it is less
ihan perfect.

With.a managed exchange rate, khe stock of foreign

eichange reserves adjusts pa~sively to reconcile the private sector's

.

demand for money and the stock of domestic credit chosen by the monetary

authorities.

Money demand equals money supply at each instant.

When

the authorities decide no longer to supply the foreign exchange demanded
at the prevailing exchange rate, the managed exchange rate regime
collapses.

Many variants exist on what takes its place.

I shall deal only with he simplest case of a free float of
indefinite duration.

2

A few of the possible alternatives are:

a

Here, as elsewhere, rational expectations are assumed. In the not
explicitly stochastic formal analysis summarized here, actual and
expected depreciation therefore coincide. Uncertainty is considered
explicitly in many of the papers on the subject, e.g. Flood and Garber
(1984), Buiter (1986a, b), Grilli (1986) etc.
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temporary float followed by a new managed exchange rate; a distrete
devaluatio~ (or "maxi-devaluation") followed by the adoption of another
exchange rate management rule; the imposition of foreign exchange
controls and/or a two-tier foreign exchange market etc.
What limitations does the need to maintain a managed exchange rate
regime put on the domestic credit expansion (dee) policies that can be

pursued by the authorities?

.*
Obstfeld (1986a) where 1R

First consider the case considered by

= i * = i-E

and th~re is therefore no financial

opportunity cost to the government of holding foreign exchange reserves.
In this case, the only reason why the government could be prevented from
running down one of its financiaJ·assets to an arbitrarily large
negative value is that its overall financial position is insolvent.

If

that happens, the government runs out of credit everywhere, i.e. it
encounters a limitation on its ability to borrow in any form.

Barring

insolvency, if reserves are required, the government can borrow them
abroad.

An infinite credit line _is no problem in such a world.

There

is· no reason, in or th e_r words, why reserves cannot bee ome an ar bit r ar i I y
large negative number.

Alternatively, one could visualize the

authorities as atquiring an infinite stock of reserves at the inception
of the managed exchange rate regime, financed by issuing an infinite
amount of debt with no net effect on public sector net worth and
solvency.

To see this, consider equations ;6) and

(7).

Assume given

paths of taxes-net-of-transfers ·T(s>, public consumption spending G(s)

and public sector capital formation K(s)

(~nd thus K(s).

The interest

rate i(s) is given by (11) and the exogenously given path of the nominal

excha_nge rate.

For simplicity, let -f and real output Y be exogenous and
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let the domestic price level be given by the law of one price, i.e.

(12)

P = P*e

p * is the exogenous world price level.

The analysis can be extended to

incorporate non-traded goods, endogenous terms of trade and sluggish
price adjustment.

The answer to the question "what limit on dee policies are imposed
-

by the need to maintain a managed exchange rate is:

"none whatsoever."

Of course the real value of seigniorage that can be extracted by the
monetary authorities may be a function of the path of the nominal
exchange rate (i~e. specifically of the (expected) proportional rate of
depreciation. of the exchange rate), but this has nothing to do with the
choice of dee for a given path of the exchange rate.
· budget identity in equation (5) again.

Consider the

With the assumptions made so

far, ev~rything on the right-hand-side of that equation is determined.

(Note from equation (10) that with rand E constant and with foreign·

* seigniorage is given by M = (n+E+rr}M).
inflation denoted rr,

With the

path of K also given~ the fiscal program, and the growth in the demand
for money fully determine the ~ehavior of the government's non-monetary
financial liabilities, B-eR*.

Government solvency requires, fro•

equation (6) ~and ignoring public sector capital) that B-eR* grows
ultimately at a proportional rate less than the nominal interest rate.
The behavior of B-eR* is quite independent of the path of domestic
credit expansion, which only determines the composition of the given·
change in B-eR* between changes in Band changes in -eR*,

Specifically,
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. * and lower B, with
higher dee will, since eR. * _ M-D, lead to lower R

.
B-eR'* unchanged:

the authorities run down foreign exchange reserves

more rapidly but borrow less.

Specifically, and in contradiction to

·the analysis of Obstfeld (1986a, pp. 9-12)

1

domestic credit can grow at

a proportional rate in excess of the nominal interest rate; this will of
course lead to reserve losses, possibly at a proportional rate in excess
of the nominal interest rate.

What matters for solvency, however, is

the ultimate proportional growth rate of B-eR * •

If this is less than

the nominal interest rate for any rate of dee it will be less than the
nominal interest rate for all rates of dee, however high, because
solvency when

i* = i* is indep~ndent of the dee policy.
R

By not

considering government borrowing, lother than by running down foreign
exchange reserves), the asymptotic constraint on the growth rate of

.*

B-eR

.

becomes a constraint on -eR

words, with
~

B =0

,

public sector deficit.

*

in Obstfeld's analysis.

In other

changes in dee are ipso facto changes in the
With seigniorage independent of dee under a

managed exchangea rate regime, -changes in dee are also ipso facto
changes in the rate at which reserves are run down.

With

B =0

,

the

consequences for solvency of a change in the public sector deficit are
erroneously attributed to the .change in de~.
On the right hand side of equation (7), the last term (which

* ~ill vanish wh en 1. *R = i* = i-E.
involves R)

*
R* enters only with Bas B-eR.

Apart from this last term,

This indicates that any stock-shift

open market s~le or purchase of government debt will, since it leaves
B-eR

*

.

unchanged, leave the solvency of the government's fiscal-financial

program unaffected.
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It could of course happen that equation (6) is violated for the
given fiscal program (T(s), 6(s), K(s)) and for the path of seigniorage
(M(s)) generated by the exchange rate management rule chosen by .the
authorities.

Given the exchange rate rule, the government then is

insolvent for any dee rate.

Depending on the nature of the money demand

function, i.e. on the way in which seigniorage varies with the chosen
exchange rate path (or with the exchange rate path generated when the
exthange rate is left to float freely) a different exchange rate rule
(or a free or dirty float) may restore solvency to the government even
without changes in the paths of current and future T, G or K.

The mopey

demand function given in equation (10) e.g. has real seignioragJ varying
with the nominal interest rate.

All this~ however, doesn't change the

proposition that if reserves carry the same interest rate as government
debt, the ~olvency of a give~ managed exchange rate regime is not
contingent on the growth rate of domestic credit.
Now consider the case where reserves earn less than government

·* = E = O, as would be
For simplicity consider the case where 1R
the case with an ideal gold standard, and i

> O.

From equation (7) it

is clear that setting oneself up with a larger stock of reserves (let
alone an infinitely large stock) now hurts solvency.

A stock-shift open

* will. now,
market sale of government debt (equal increases in Band eR)
for a given path of dee, raise the value of the last term on the

right-hand-side of equation (7).

Since a non-interest-bearing asset is

acquired by issuing an interest-bearing liability, solvency is impaireci.

On the other hand, given any initial stocks of debt, capitll and
reserves, and given future trajectories for T, 6 and K, higher rates of
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domestic credit expansion will improve solvency, by permitting ·the
government _to run down non-interest-bearing foreign exchange reserves
rather than issue interest-bearing debt.

When i: =

o,

equations (6) and

(7) can be replaced by:
. ( b. >

(a(v)-p(v)K(v)] exp [-{ i (u)du] _;; 0

1i m

and

co

(7.)

J

exp [-{ i (u) du ]ds

T(s) exp [-{ i (u)du ]ds

t
~

B<t> - p(t)K(t)
co

+

J

p (s) 6(s)exp [-{ i(u)du}ds

t
co

+

I

1

[i ( s ) - (t ( s ) + rr(s)) ]p(s)K(s)exp [-{ i (u) du jds

t

Equations (6') and (7') and the budget identity
d

.

dt(B-pK)

= i(B-pK)

- [T-pG-(i-<t+rr))pKJ - D

make it apparent that government solvency again doesn't put any upper
limits on dee rates whatsoever.

Quite the contrary, by choosing a

sufficiently high rate of dee, ~therwise insolvent fiscal-financial
plans can be made solvent.

Why should large negative reserve holdings

matter, when the government's balance she~t is strengthened by
substituting reserve financing for borrowing?
it easier for debt

(B)

Cet.par. higher dee makes

to grow (ultimately) at a rate less than i and
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thus to satisfy (6'),
The upshot is that the government budget identity and solvency
constraint literature really hasn't taught us anything about the need
for international reserves, the reasons for foreign exchange rate crises
and the fiscal and dee prerequisites for a viable managed exchange rate
= i * = i-E, one would not expect to see an exchange

regime,

rate crisis that isn't also a debt crisis.

A selling attack on the

currency should be accompanied by the government's interest-bearing debt
(even when this is denominated in terms of foreign currency,
index-linked or whatnot) selling at a discount relative to its nominal
parity.

Here an exchange rate crisis is a purely fiscal phenomenon. ·

When i: = O, and more generally when i:

< i*

.= i-E, borrowing ~orsens

future deficits while running down reserves doesn't, and the reasons for
foreign exchange crises that aren't also solvency crises are even less
. apparent.
A ~atisfactory· theory of foreign exchange crises in spite of
solvency requires two ingredient~, both_ missing thus far.

First, a

riason for the existence of a specific class of financial or real claims
required in international exchange and distinct from general credit.
Second, a reason given why these 'required' reserves cannot be borrowed
instantaneously.

Deeper theory is needed hEre than is offered by the

ad-hoc and question-begging open economy cash-in-advance model, to
provide acceptable microeconomic foundations of the alleged unique
transactions role of certain reserve assets and of the alleged inferior
liquidity characteristics.of other financial or real claims, (some of

which may be liabilities of the same agent that issue the reserves),
Reserve assets with these two features will' indeed provide a rationale
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fer the existence of a lower bound on the stock of reserves at ·any
instant.

Limits on the government's ability to tax will set a finite

upper bound on the government's net-interest-bearing debt-output ratio,

.* =
but this involves an upper limit on B-eR * when 1R

.*

1

and an upper

limit on B when i; = 0 1 and never a lower limit on R*.
Biven such a limit, it becomes possible to generate scenarios in
which there could be a run on the currency without a default risk
discount on the public debt.
Advanced industrial countries like the Netherlands, which are
tightly integrated·into a sophisticated system of international
financial markets do, however, seem to be poorly characterized by a
model in which significant penalties are attached to holding inadequate
quantities of a limited class af international reserve assets or in
which there are non-trivial delays in the process through which the
Central Bank can raise readily spendable resources.

Indeed the very

meaning of "international reserves" becomes fuzzy for such countries, as
tWe official balance sheet contains both highly liquid,
market-rates-of-interest-bearing-assets and highly liquid,
market-rates-of-interest-bearing-liabilitie s and as unused lines of
credit, swap arrangements etc. are available to back the Bank's resolve
to defend the parity.

(See Dooley (1986) and Buitet (1986c)).

For such

a country a foreign exchange crisis is, neither more nor less than a

fiscal or solvency crisis, which doesn't, however, make it any easier to
solve.

The final section reviews some of the results derived in models

*

.
where an ad-hoc exogenous lower bound on R , which without loss of
generality I choose to be zero; is assumed to eiist.
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4.

Running Out of Reserves
Consider the case of a small open economy which manages the

exchange rate (i.e. fixes Eat some constant level) as long as the stock
of international reserves is positive, but adopts a free float once
reserves fall below zero.
A quick check on the viability of the managed exchange rate regime
involves the comparison of the eventual rate of growth of the money
stock from equation

* say,

f,.t

( B) '
A

under the managed rate, µ

and the rate of growth of money demand

.

V
wh_ere, from <10) V = 0 if
= rr* + E + n - v'
µ * exceedsµ the reserve threshold will be

r

A

+ rr + E is constant.

If

crossed eventually, and the regim~ will collapse.
It is, however, possible to be more precise about the nature
(including the magnitude) and fhe timing of a collapse.

It is easiest

to think of this in the context of a "structurally weak" currency i.e.
one for which dee· systematical 1 y exceeds money demand growth (though
both may be stochastic).

An e¥entual collapse is therefore certain.

In the case of s~ructurally weak currency, the (endogenous)
expected proportional rate of currency depreciation after the collapse

will typically b~ higher than the exogenous proportional rate of
depreciation of the managed exchange rate.

With UIP this means that the

nominal inter~st rate increases at the moment the managed exchange rate
regime collapses.

If the demand for money is a declining function of

the nominal rate of interest, there will be a stock-shift reduction in
the demand for money at the moment the ma~aged exchange rate regime
collapses.

Given dee, this stock-shift reduction in money demand is

reflected in~ stock-shift reduction in the stock of reserves to the
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critical threshold level.

This final stock-shift purchase by the

private sector of the monetary authority's remaining foreign exchange
reserves has been called a

0

speculative attack."

Even though the

exogenous shocks to money demand and dee may be small, the final
depletion of the official reserves includes an endogenous component
(reflecting the inc,ease in the nominal interest rate and the interest
sensitivity of money demand) which may be large relative to the final
exogenous shocks that triggered the attack.

The top panel of Figure 2

illustrates this for the ca-se of a continuous time model where the
instantaneous exogenous shocks are infintesimal relative to the
outstanding stock of reserves.

Except at the moment the attack occurs,

at t , the stock_of reserves declines in a c~ntinuous fashion. · (See
1

Krugman (1979)

1

Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld {1984), Buiter

(1986a), Grilli (1986), Garber and Grilli (19B6), Connolly and Ta'ylor
. (1984)).

et.R*

= tJ1 = -

"I p y .t.i

2

t

t0
e

...
e

e

tl
Figure 2

t

26

A convenient device for calculating the timing (or in stochastic
models the probability density function of the timing) of a collapse is

"'
the ushadow floating exchange rate," e.

The shadciw floating exchange

rate at time t is the floating exchange rate that would prevail at time

t if the managed exchange rate regime were to collapse at that instant.
If the dee process does not change if and when the managed exchange rate
system collapses, the managed regime is viable as long as the shadow
exchange rate is below the managed rate but collapses the first time the
shadow floating rate exceeds the managed rate.

The lower panel in

Figure 2 illustrates this for the case of a fixed exchange rate, e.

"'
The reason is that private speculators would, if e > e, buy up the
remaining foreig~ exchange reserves of the authorities and fore~ an
abandonm~nt of the managed rate.

The floating rate that would result

"'
would bee> e, thus giving the speculators handsome excess returns on
.

. their purchase of the foreign exchange reserves.

The "efficient

markets~ requirement that there can be no anticipated excess returns

"'
locates the date of the collapse at the_ first crossing of e bye from
below.

Note the strong parallels with the literature on the collapse of

price stabilization schemes for commodities, through buffer stocks etc.
The collapsing exchange rate regime literature is indeed a (recognized)
offspring of this older liter~ture (see especially Salant and Henderson
(1978) and Salant (1983)).
There is an important caveat here, as was pointed out by Obstfeld
in an elegant paper (Obstfeld (1986b)), which applied a chain of
reasoning similar to that used by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in their
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analysis of "commercial bank runs."

If the nature of the dee process

varies according as to whether there is a managed exchange rate or a

freely floating exchange rate in effect, there may· be multiple
equilibria and "bootstrap" or rational and self-fulfil ling balance of
payments crises,

Consider the case where in the absence of an attack,

the fixed exchange rate regime is indefinitel y viable.

In the absence

of a speculative attack, e.g., the dee process and the growth of money
demand are such that the stock of reserves follows a stationary (or
stable) first-order autoregress ive process with random shocks that have
bounded support, i.e.

lo: I < 1 ,

u < ut < u

*
Biven this specificati on, Rt will always be above !(1-o:)
-

-u(l-o:)

-1

.

-1

and below

(assuming it started off betweeri these two values).

reserve threst;old is below !:!J..1-o:)

-1

If the

, there can be no "natural collapse

0

of the fixed exchange rate, i.e. no collapse without a speculative
at'tack,

Could a speculative attack ever be rational under these

circumstanc es?

Consider the case where, if the fixed exchange rate

regime were to collapse, the authorities would change their dee policy
from the restrained one which· generates (13) to a wildly expansionar y
one which would generate a very much higher expected rate of exchange

depreciation and a very much higher nominal interest rate than under the
fixed rate.

It is now possible, as Obstfeld (1986b) shows, that if

private agents expect a run to take place in a period, it will be
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profitable for them to participate in it, because the shadow exchange
rate in that period exceeds the fixed exchange rate.

If they don't

expect a run, they will refrain from buying up the authorities'
remaining reserves, and this decision too will be validated because
without a run reserves stay above their minimum threshold level.

The

events that trigger the belief that a run will occur can be totally
extraneous.

Since what permits such self-rationalizing attacks is the

expectations-validating dee behavior of the authorities in the event of
an attack, policy makers can avoid them by abandoning their policy of
responding to collapses in that manner.
In Buiter (1986a) dee is broken down into its components:
primary deficit,.interest payments and government lending.

the

Borrowing to

defend the e~change rate, i.e. holding constant the primary deficit and
engaging in a once-off stock-shift open market sale, will, if reserves
. earn an interest rate below the rate on government debt, lower the
likelih~od of an early collapse (by raising the level of the stock of
reserves) but increase the likelihood of a collapse in the longer run
(b'y r a i s i ng th e r at e at wh i c h r es er ves a r e b e i n g r u n down ) •

If t h ere i s

no financial opportunity cost, as pointed ~ut before, an open market
sale will lower the likelihood of a collapse for all future periods.
Finally, in Buiter {1986b), which develops an approach initiated in
Grilli {1986), the collapsing managed exchange rate regime literature is
put in a (very simple) two-country setting, where speculative selling
attacks agai~st either currency can force the system off the managed
standard.

When holding reserves involves a pecuniary opportunity cost,
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dee management in both countries is required to avoid crossing reserve
thresholds_ and management of the primary deficits is required to avoid

· the possibility of reserve stabilization leading to public debt
destabilization.

In a stochastic environment even the policy

combination of.I) no sterilization of reserve gains or losses and 2)
continuously balanced budgets, may not be capable of safeguarding both
the managed exchange rate system and fiscal solvency.
It should ~ot come as a surprise that there is nothing automatic
about the viability of managed exchange rate systems, even one as
rarified as an idealized gold stan~ard.

When survival of the exchange

rate system is defined in terms of reserve thresholds and solvency in
terms of a debt burden threshold, it is to be expected that dee and
primary deficit policies that are consistent with survival should "feed
ba-c k" from these stocks or st.ock-f 1ow ratios.

Open-1 oop dee and f i seal

policies in a stochastic environment are bound to spell disaster.

S.

Conclusion.
In a recent paper, Helpman and Razin {1986) make the following apt

observation.
0

It is now understood that exchange rates cannot be managed without

the pursuit of other policies which make the entire package
internally consistent •••• Governments or central banks can only
temporarily target exchange rates without giving due attention to
other policies.

However, eventually they have to choose or are

fQrceG to choose measures which validate ex-post the feasibility of
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their exchange rate policy.

These measures will typically be

anticipated by economic agents during the initial periods of
exchange rate management, thereby generating immediate pressure in
various markets.

Hence, the success of exchange rate management

policy depends to a large extent on other policies, commitments to
future policies, and their effects on expectations."

(Helpman and

Razin (1986), p. 1)
This paper has ~ried to make concrete the points made by Helpman
and Razin in the above quot~, and it underwrites completely their
general argument.

The sp~cific prdpositions that emerg~ do, however,

contradict or qualify a certain amount of recent conventional wisdom.
One such qualification applies to the effer.t of larger public sector
~eficits on the rate of inflation when veloci~y is endogenous.

A rather

basic flaw in some popular mo'dels of hyperinflation also stands out.
The meaning and relevance of reserve thresholds in a world with solvent
governments than can borrow at home and abroad is still unclear.

A

recent proposition that the goyernment solvency constraint implies a
limit on dee growth if· a managed exchange rate regime is to survive
appears incorrect.
One encouraging (or surp_rising?). fact- is that managed exchange rate
regimes have been in existence for long periods of time, including the
present, in spite of this absence of a satisfactory "deep theory."
analogy with driving a car comes to mind:
I haven't a tlue why or how it works.

The

I can get it to work although

The difference is that in the

case of cars there are (I presume) those who truly do know and
understand.

As regards managed exchange rate regimes I'm not so sure.
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